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Abstract. In recent years numerous advanced malware, aka advanced per-
sistent threats (APT) are allegedly developed by nation-states. The task
of attributing an APT to a specific nation-state is extremely challenging
for several reasons. Each nation-state has usually more than a single cyber
unit that develops such advanced malware, rendering traditional authorship
attribution algorithms useless. Furthermore, those APTs use state-of-the-
art evasion techniques, making feature extraction challenging. Finally, the
dataset of such available APTs is extremely small.
In this paper we describe how deep neural networks (DNN) could be success-
fully employed for nation-state APT attribution. We use sandbox reports
(recording the behavior of the APT when run dynamically) as raw input
for the neural network, allowing the DNN to learn high level feature ab-
stractions of the APTs itself. Using a test set of 1,000 Chinese and Russian
developed APTs, we achieved an accuracy rate of 94.6%.
1 Introduction
While malware detection is always a challenging research topic, a special challenge
involves nation-state advanced persistent threats (APT), highly sophisticated and
evasive malware. Since the usage of such cyber weapons might be considered an
act of war [10], the question “which country is responsible?” could become critical.
In this paper we use raw features of dynamic analysis to train a nation-state
APT attribution classifier. The main contribution of this paper is providing the
first nation-state APT attribution classifier, which achieves a high accuracy on the
largest test set of available nation-state developed APTs ever collected, successfully
attributing new malware families.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 contains the relevant
related work to our use cases. Section 3 specifies the problem definition and the
unique challenges in this domain, both with nation-state APT attribution in general
and especially when using feature engineering. Section 4 contains our nation-state
APT attribution classifier implementation and the experimental results. Section 5
contains our concluding remarks.
2 Background and Related Work
There are numerous topics related to authorship attribution, such as plagiarism
detection, books authorship attribution, source code authorship attribution and
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binary program authorship attribution. [15] provides a broad review of many of
those topics, including the natural language processing (NLP) and traditional ma-
chine learning (ML) algorithms and the relevant features used, for example lexical
(e.g., word frequencies), syntactic (e.g., sentence structure), semantic (e.g., syn-
onyms), and application specific (such as a specific structure, for instance HTML).
In the following sub-sections, we focus only on the ones relevant to our work
(and ignoring those that are irrelevant, such as source code authorship attribution,
which cannot be used in our case since a source code is not available for the APTs).
2.1 Binary Code Authorship Attribution
Certain stylistic features can survive the compilation process and remain intact
in binary code, which leads to the feasibility of authorship attribution for binary
code. Rosenblum et al. [13] extracted syntax-based and semantic-based features
using predefined templates, such as idioms (sequences of three consecutive instruc-
tions), n-grams, and graphlets. Machine learning techniques are then applied to
rank these features based on their relative correlations with authorship. Alrabaee
et al. [1] extracted a sequence of instructions with specific semantics and to con-
struct a graph-based on register manipulation, where a machine learning algorithm
is applied afterwards. Caliskan et al. [5] extracted syntactical features present in
source code from decompiled executable binary.
Though these approaches represent a great effort in authorship attribution, it
should be noted that they were not applied to real malware. Furthermore, some lim-
itations could be observed including weak accuracy in the case of multiple authors,
being potentially thwarted by light obfuscation, and their inability to decouple
features related to functionality from those related to authors styles.
2.2 Malware Attribution
The difficulty in obtaining ground truth labels for samples has led much work in this
area to focus on clustering malware, and the wide range of obfuscation techniques
in common use have led many researchers to focus on dynamic analysis rather
than static features (i.e., instead of examining the static file, focus on the report
generated after running the file dynamically in a sandbox).
The work of Pfeffer et al. [12] examines information obtained via both static
and dynamic analysis of malware samples, in order to organize code samples into
lineages that indicate the order in which samples are derived from each other.
Alrabaee et al. [2] have used both features extracted from the disassembled mal-
ware code (such as idioms) and from the executable itself, used mutual informa-
tion and information gain to rank them, and built an SVM classifier using the
top ranked features. Those methods require a large amount of pre-processing and
manual domain-specific feature engineering to obtain the relevant features.
The malware attribution papers mentioned so far are applicable only to cases
where a malware is an evolution of another malware (e.g., by mutation), or from the
same family, functionality-wise. These methods are not effective when completely
different families of malware are examined. Our paper presents a novel application
of DNN for APT attribution, specifying which nation has developed a specific
APT, when the APTs in question are not derivatives of one another, and belong
to completely different families.
The work of Marquis-Boire et al. [4] examines several static features intended
to provide credible links between executable malware binary produced by the same
authors. However, many of these features are specific to malware, such as command
and control infrastructure and data exfiltration methods, and the authors note that
these features must be extracted manually. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
only available paper that explicitly dealt with nation-state APTs detection (using
features common in them, such as APTs). However, those use cases are limited,
and no accuracy or other performance measures were provided. In addition, the
paper did not deal with classifying which nation developed the malware, and rather
mentioned that one could use the similarities between a known (labeled) nation-
state APT to an unknown one to infer the attribution of the latter.
3 Problem Definition: Nation-State APT Attribution
Given an APT as an executable file, we would like to determine which nation
state developed it. This is a multi-class classification problem, i.e., one label per
candidate nation-state.
3.1 The Challenges of Nation-State Attribution
Trying to classify the nation that developed an APT can be an extremely challeng-
ing task for several reasons that we cover here.
Each nation-state has usually more than a single cyber unit developing such
products, and there is more than a single developer in each unit. This means that
the accuracy of traditional authorship attribution algorithms, which associates the
author of source code or program using stylistic features in the source code, or such
features that have survived the compilation, would be very limited.
These APTs also use state-of-the-art evasion techniques, such-as anti-VM, anti-
debugging, code obfuscation and encryption ([16]), making feature extraction chal-
lenging.
Moreover, the number of such available APTs is small, since such APTs tend
to be targeted, used for specific purposes (and, unlike common criminal malware,
not for monetary gain) and therefore are not available on many computers. Their
evasion mechanisms make them hard to detect as well. This results in a further
decrease in the training set size from which to learn.
Finally, since nation states are aware that their APTs can be caught, they com-
monly might try to fool the security researchers examining the APT to think that
another malware developer group (e.g., another nation) has developed it (e.g., by
adding the APT strings in a foreign language, embedding data associated with a
previously published malware, etc.). That is, unlike traditional authorship attribu-
tion problems, in this case the “authors” are actively trying to evade attribution
and encourage false attribution.
Despite these issues, manual nation-state APT attribution is performed, mostly
based on functional similarities, shared command and control servers (C&Cs, which
provide an accurate attribution), etc. For example, the APTs Duqu, Flame and
Gauss were attributed to the same origin as Stuxnet following a very cumbersome
advanced manual analysis ([3]). The question is: How can we overcome these chal-
lenges and create an automated classifier (that does not require lengthy manual
analysis)?
3.2 Using Raw Features in DNN Classifications in the Cyber Security
Domain
One of Deep Neural Networks (DNN) greatest advantages is the ability to use raw
features as input, while learning higher level features on its own during the training
process. In this process, each hidden layer extracts higher level features from the
previous layer, creating a hierarchy of higher-level features.
This is the reason why deep learning classifiers perform better than traditional
machine learning classifiers in complex tasks that requires domain-specific features
such as language understanding [6], speech recognition, image recognition [17], etc.
In such a framework the input is not high level features, which are derived manually
based on limited dataset, thus not necessarily fitting the task at hand. Instead, the
input is raw features (pixels in image processing, characters in NLP, etc.). The DNN
learns a high-level hierarchy of the features during the training phase. The deeper
the hidden layer is the higher the abstraction level of the features (higher-level
features).
While most previous work on applying machine learning to malware analysis
relied on manually crafted features, David et al. [7] trained DNN on raw dynamic
analysis reports to generate malware signatures for use in a malware family classi-
fication context. In this paper we similarly train a DNN on raw dynamic analysis
reports but the goal is obtaining a different functionality (APT attribution rather
than signature generation).
The benefits of using raw features are:
(1) Cheaper and less time consuming than manual feature engineering. This is
especially true in the case of nation-state APTs, where the code requires a lot of
time to reverse engineer in-order to gain insights about features, due to obfuscation
techniques commonly used by it, as mentioned above.
(2) Higher accuracy of Deep Learning classifiers, since important features are
never overlooked. For instance, in our nation-state APT attribution classifier, men-
tioned in the next section, we have used the technique suggested in [11] to assess
the contribution of each of our features, by multiplying (and summing up) their
weights in the network, where the highest value indicates the most significant fea-
ture. We have seen that, besides the expected API calls and IP strings of C&C
servers, arbitrary hexadecimal values were surprisingly some of the most impor-
tant features. A security researcher might throw such addresses away, since they
are useless. However, those values were the size of data of specific PE section which
contained encrypted malicious shellcode, identifying a specific malware family.
(3) More flexibility due to the ability to use the same features for different
classification objectives. For instance, our nation-state APT attribution classifier
uses the same raw features of the malware signature generator implemented in [7].
Therefore, we could implement both, using only a single feature extraction process.
4 Implementation and Experimental Evaluation
The challenges mentioned in the previous section require a novel approach in-
order to mitigate them. As mentioned before, the problem at hand is not a regular
authorship attribution problem, since more than a single developer is likely to be
involved, some of them might be replaced in the middle of the development. This
makes regular authorship attribution algorithms, using personal stylistic features
irrelevant. Another approach would be to consider all of the same nation state APTs
as a part of a single malware family. The rationale is that common frameworks and
functionality should exist in different APTs from the same nation. However, this
is also not accurate: each nation might have several cyber units, each with its own
targets, frameworks, functionality, etc. Thus, it would be more accurate to look
at this classification task as a malicious/benign classifier: each label might contain
several “families” (benign web browsers, malicious ransomware, etc.) that might
have very little in common. Fortunately, DNN is known to excel in such complex
tasks.
This brings us to the usage of raw features: since we do not know how many
“actual APT families” are available in the dataset, we need to use raw features,
letting the DNN build its feature abstraction hierarchy itself, taking into account
all available APT families, as mentioned in section 1.
4.1 Raw Features Used
A sandbox analysis report of an executable file can provide a lot of useful infor-
mation, which can be leveraged for many different classification tasks. In order to
show the advantages of using raw features by a DNN classifier, we have chosen raw
features that can be used for different classification tasks.
Cuckoo Sandbox is a widely used open-source project for automated dynamic
malware analysis. It provides static analysis of the analyzed file: PE header meta-
data, imports, exports, sections, etc. Therefore, it can provide useful information
even in the absence of dynamic analysis, due to, e.g., anti-VM techniques used
by nation-state APTs. Cuckoo Sandbox also provides dynamic analysis and moni-
tors the process system calls, their arguments and their return value. Thus, it can
provide useful information to mitigate obfuscation techniques used by nation-state
APTs. We have decided to use Cuckoo Sandbox reports as raw data for our clas-
sifiers due to their level of detail, configurability, and popularity. We used Cuckoo
Sandbox default configuration.
Our purpose was to let our classifiers learn the high-level abstraction hierarchy
on their own, without involving any manual or domain-specific knowledge. Thus,
we used words only, which are basic raw features commonly used in the text anal-
ysis domain. Although Cuckoo reports are in JSON format, which can be parsed
such that specific information is obtained from them, we did not perform any pars-
ing. In other words, we treated the reports as raw text, completely ignoring the
formatting, syntax, etc. Our goal was to let our classifiers learn everything on their
own, including JSON parsing, if necessary. Therefore, the markup and tagged parts
of the files were extracted as well. For instance, in "api: CreateFileW" the terms
extracted are "api" and "CreateFileW", while completely ignoring what each part
means.
Specifically, our method follows the following simple steps to convert sandbox
files into fixed size inputs to the neural network:
(1) Select as features the top 50,000 words with highest frequency in all Cuckoo
reports, after removing the words which appear in all files. The rationale is that
words which appear in all files, and words which are very uncommon do not contain
lots of useful information.
(2) Convert each sandbox file to a 50,000-sized bit string by checking whether
each of the 50,000 words appear in it. That is, for each analyzed Cuckoo report,
feature[i]=1 if the i-th most common word appears in that cuckoo report, or 0
otherwise.
In other words, we first defined which words participated in our dictionary (anal-
ogous to the dictionaries used in NLP, which usually consist of the most frequent
words in a language) and then we checked each sample against the dictionary for
the presence of each word, thus producing a binary input vector.
4.2 Network Architecture and Hyper-Parameters
We trained a classifier based on Cuckoo reports of samples of APT which were
developed (allegedly) by nation-states. Due to the small quantity of available sam-
ples, we used only two classes: Russia and China (which are apparently the most
prolific APT developers).
Our training-set included 1,600 files from each class (training set size of 3,200
samples) of dozens of known campaigns of nation-developed APTs. 200 samples
from the training set were used as a validation set. The test set contained additional
500 files from each class (test set size of 1,000 files). The labels (i.e., ground-truth
attribution) of all these files are based on well-documented and extended manual
analyses within the cyber-security community, conducted during the past years.
Note that the above-mentioned separation between training and test
sets completely separates between different APT families as well. That
is, if an APT family is in test set, then all its variations are also in test
set only. This makes the training challenge much more difficult (and
more applicable to real-world), as in many cases inevitably we will be
training on APT developed by one group of developers, and testing on
APT developed by a completely different group.
Our DNN architecture is a 10-layers fully-connected neural network, with 50,000-
2,000-1,000-1,000-1,000-1,000-1,000-1,000-500-2 neurons, (that is, 50,000 neurons
on the input layer, 2,000 in the first hidden layer, etc.), with an additional output
softmax layer. We used a dropout ([14]) rate of 0.5 (ignoring 50% of the neurons
in hidden layers for each sample) and an input noise (zeroing) rate of 0.2 (ignoring
20% of input neurons) to prevent overfitting. A ReLU ([8]) activation function was
used, and an initial learning rate of 10−2 which decayed to 10−5 over 1000 epochs.
These hyper-parameters were optimized using the validation set.
4.3 Experimental Evaluation
Following the training phase, we tested the accuracy of the DNN model over the
test set. The accuracy for the nation-state APT attribution classifer was 94.6%
on the test set, which contained only families that were not in the training set.
These are test accuracies are surprising in light of the complete separation of
malware families between train and test sets. Inevitably in many cases the devel-
opers or even the developing units of the APT in train and test sets are different
(e.g., APTs in train set developed by one Chinese cyber unit, and APTs in test set
developed by another Chinese cyber unit).
Given this strict separation, and in light of the high accuracy results obtained,
the results lead to the conclusion that each nation-state has (apparently) different
sets of methodologies for developing APTs, such that two separate cyber units from
nation A are still more similar to each other than to a cyber unit from nation B.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we presented the first successful method for automatic APT attri-
bution to nation-states, using raw dynamic analysis reports as input, and training
a deep neural network for the attribution task. The use of raw features has the
advantages of saving costs and time involved in the manual training and analysis
process. It also prevents losing indicative data and classifier accuracy, and allows
flexibility, using the same raw features for many different classification tasks.
Our results presented here lead to the conclusion that despite all the efforts de-
voted by nation states and their different cyber units in developing unattributable
APTs, it is still possible to reach a rather accurate attribution. Additionally, differ-
ent nation-states use different APT developing methodologies, such that the works
of developers in separate cyber units are still sufficiently similar to each other that
allow for attribution.
While the work presented here could help facilitate automatic attribution of
nation-state attacks, we are aware that nation-states could subvert the methods
presented here such that they would modify their new APTs to lead to their misclas-
sification and attribution to another nation-state. For example, using deep neural
networks themselves, they could employ generative adversarial networks (GAN)[9]
to modify their APT until it successfully fools our classifier into attributing it
to another nation-state. Applying GAN for APT modification would prove very
difficult, but theoretically possible.
In our future works in this area we will examine additional nation state labels
(multi-class classifier), once larger datasets of such APTs become available.
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